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It has become common practice to estimate the response of asset prices to monetary 
policy actions using market-based measures such as the unexpected change in the federal 
funds futures rate as proxies for monetary policy shocks. I show that because interest 
rates and market-based measures of monetary policy shocks respond simultaneously to 
all news rather than simply news about monetary policy actions, estimates of the response 
of interest rates to monetary policy using only monetary policy news measures are biased. 
I propose a methodology that corrects for this “joint-response bias.” The results indicate 
that when the bias is accounted for the response of Treasury yields to monetary policy 
actions is considerably smaller than previously estimated. 
 
JEL Classification: E40, E52 
Key words: monetary policy shocks, identification, simultaneity, federal funds target   1 
1.  Introduction  
Monetary policymakers and financial market participants are interested in knowing how 
market interest rates respond to Federal Reserve actions. Cook and Hahn (1989) were the 
first to estimate the response of Treasury yields to changes in the Fed’s target for the 
federal funds rate. Specifically, they regressed daily changes in various Treasury yields 
on changes in the target. They found that Treasury rates across the maturity spectrum 
responded strongly and significantly to changes in the federal funds rate target during the 
period 1973-9. 
Using Cook and Hahn’s (1989) methodology for the period of June 6, 1989 
througth February 2, 2000, Kuttner (2001) found a uniformly smaller response of 
Treasury rates to funds rate target changes. Kuttner (2001) argued that the relative failure 
of Cook and Hahn’s methodology in the latter period was likely a consequence of the 
failure to differentiate between expected and unexpected target changes. 
Kuttner (2001) used the change in the federal funds futures rate on days when the 
funds rate target was changed as a proxy for the unexpected target change. Since then, it 
has become common practice to estimate the response of interest rates and other asset 
prices to unanticipated monetary policy actions using market-based measures of 
unexpected monetary policy actions—federal funds futures rates, eurodollar deposit rates, 
the 3-month T-bill rate, and eurodollar futures rates (e.g., Poole and Rasche, 2000; Poole 
et al., 2002; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Bomfim, 2003; Faust et al., 2004; Gürkaynak 
et al., 2007; Hamilton, 2008). 
The implicit assumption with this approach is that the market measures responded 
to surprise monetary policy only on days when policy actions were taken. However, asset   2 
prices, including market-based measures of monetary policy shocks, respond to news 
every day. Consequently, the estimated response of asset prices to monetary policy 
actions using market-based measures of monetary policy shocks will be biased and 
inconsistent. 
The literature advances two approaches to dealing with this problem. The first is 
to avoid the problem entirely by using ultra-high-frequency data a few minutes around 
the time of the announcement (e.g., Gürkaynak et al., 2007). There are two problems with 
this approach. First, not all policy actions are announced. This is especially true 
historically. For example, prior to February 1994, FOMC policy actions were not 
announced. The market had to infer Fed actions based on signals from the Trading Desk 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (hereafter, Desk) and other information (e.g., 
Feinman, 1993). 
Second, markets might initially overreact to announcements. If so, the ultra-high-
frequency response would not be indicative of the lower-frequency response, which 
might be more representative of the market’s reaction. For example, Gürkaynak et al., 
(2005) note that, 
The Federal Reserve’s announcement following its January 28, 2004, 
policy meeting led to one of the largest reactions in the Treasury market 
on record, with two- and five-year yields jumping 20 and 25 basis points 
(bp) respectively in the half-hour surrounding the announcement—the 
largest movements around any Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
announcement over the fourteen years for which we have data. 
 
While the immediate reactions to this announcement were exceptional, the 
reactions measured at a daily frequency were much less so. Of the 267 daily observations 
used in this study, 38 of the daily changes in the 2-year yield and 14 daily changes in the 
5-year yield were greater than or equal to 20 and 25 basis points, respectively. Moreover,   3 
only 6 of the former and 2 of the latter occurred on days when either the target was 
changed or there was an FOMC meeting. Hence, using extremely high-frequency data 
may give a misleading picture of the extent to which interest rates respond to monetary 
policy shocks. Of course, Gürkaynak et al., (2005) might argue that is exactly the point; 
their procedure accounts for the news that comes in over the remainder of the day that 
offsets the effect of policy announcements on rates. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
determine whether the difference between the immediate response and the daily response 
is because the market initially overreacted or simply responded to new information. In 
any event, the approach presented here corrects for the joint-response bias without 
relying on ultra-high-frequency data. 
The second approach used by Rigobon and Sack (2004) and Craine and Martin 
(2008) is called identification through heteroskedasticity. This approach to econometric 
identification has been known for a long time (e.g., Fisher, 1966) but infrequently used. It 
requires making an assumption about the relative variance of shocks. For example, 
Rigobon and Sack (2004) assume that the variance of a shock is larger on days when 
there are FOMC meetings or the Chairman’s semi-annual testimony. 
The methodology in this paper corrects for the bias without making an assumption 
about the relative variance of shocks. Specifically it uses the market-based measure on all 
days as a latent variable. The latent variable accounts for the relationship between asset 
prices and the market-based measure of monetary policy shocks on days when there are 
no unexpected policy actions. The methodology permits one to identify the marginal 
effect of monetary policy shocks relative to nonmonetary policy shocks. The 
methodology is simple to employ, requires a simple identifying assumption, and is easily   4 
modified to account for the effects of other newsworthy events, such as the market’s 
reaction to other headline news. 
To preview the results: When the joint-response bias is accounted for, the 
response of Treasury rates is considerably smaller than previously reported. For data 
prior to February 3, 2000, the marginal response of yields on Treasury securities with 
maturities of one year or less is about half of that obtained using the standard 
methodology, and, for those with maturities longer than one year, there is no statistically 
significant response beyond the response to ambient news. For data after February 2, 
2000, none of the Treasury rates respond significantly to unanticipated monetary policy 
actions. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 analyses the 
response of interest rates to news. Cook and Hahn’s (1989) event-study methodology and 
Kuttner’s (2001) refinement of the methodology are presented in Section 3. Section 4 
shows why market-based measures of monetary policy shocks yield biased estimates of 
the response to monetary policy shocks. Section 5 presents a latent-variable methodology 
and compares the results using this and standard methodology. The conclusions are 
presented in Section 6. 
2. Estimating the Response of Interest Rates to Monetary Policy Actions 
Cook and Hahn (1989) were the first to estimate the response of Treasury rates to 
monetary policy actions. They did so by estimating the equation: 
*
t tt i ff αβ ε ∆= +∆ +,    
(1)   5 
where 
*
t ff  denotes the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate and  t i  denotes one of 
several Treasury rates.
1 β  They found that the estimate of   was very close to 0.50 for the 
3-, 6-, and 12-month T-bill rates; thereafter estimates of β  declined monotonically as the 
term to maturity increased. Estimates of β  were highly statistically significant for all 
rates, and estimates of 
2 R  ranged from 29% to 59%. 
Kuttner (2001) estimated eq. (1) over the period June 6, 1989, through February 
2, 2000, and found that the reactions of interest rates to a change in the funds rate target 
were ‘uniformly smaller and less significant than those for the 1975-1979 sample period.’ 
Moreover, there was no statistically significant response of long-term yields. Kuttner 
considered it  ‘implausible’ that this result could be due to market participants being 
unaware that the Fed was targeting the funds rate, ‘because of the Fed’s greater 
transparency,’ and suggested that, ‘a more likely explanation is that target rate changes 
have been more widely anticipated in recent years,’(Kuttner, 2001, p. 526). Specifically, 
he suggested that Cook and Hahn’s (1989) event-study methodology failed to distinguish 
between anticipated and unanticipated target changes, which resulted in ‘an attenuated 
estimate of interest rates’ response to policy surprises,’ (Kuttner, 2001, p. 527). 
Following up on Rudebusch’s (1998) suggestion that federal funds futures rates provide a 
natural forecast of the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) target for the federal 
funds rate, he suggested that the bias could be eliminated by using the federal funds 
futures rate to proxy for the unexpected component of the target change. Specifically, he 
                                                 
1 Cook and Hahn (1989) did not use the actual change in the funds target because the magnitude and timing 
of these changes were unknown. Rather, they determined when the funds rate target had changed from 
press reports in the Wall Street Journal.   6 
suggested that the response of interest rates to a monetary policy shock could be 
determined by estimating: 
*u
t tt i ff αβ ω ∆= +∆ + 
(2) 
on days when the FOMC changed its target for the funds rate. 
*u
t ff ∆  denotes the 
unexpected change in the FOMC’s funds rate target. 
The federal funds futures rate is the rate on a derivative contract whose value 
depends on the average level of the effective federal funds rate during the month of the 
contract. Consequently, the market’s expectation for the average of the effective funds 
rate over the current month on the 
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t fff  denotes the rate on the current-month federal funds futures contract,  k ff  
denotes the effective (overnight) federal funds rate, and m  denotes the number of days in 
the month. That is, the futures rate is simply a weighted average of the observed funds 
rate up to day t and the market’s expectation of the funds rate over the remainder of the 
month. If the market expects the FOMC to change its target on dayt, but not again during 
the month, then 
00
1 tt fff fff − −  would be zero. Hence, a natural way to estimate the 











(4)   7 
Aware that this measure could not be calculated on the first day of the month, 
Kuttner (2001) replaced 
0
1 t fff −  with the 1-month-ahead federal funds futures rate on the 
last day of the previous month and, noting problems with this measure on the last few 








t fff  denotes the rate on the 1-month-ahead federal funds futures contract on the 
last three days of the month.
2
While his measure can be calculated for any day, Kuttner (2001) calculated it only 
for days when the FOMC changed its target. Moreover, the expected target change, 
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can be calculated only for days when the target was changed. 
3. The Joint-Response Bias 
It is easy to demonstrate that the estimate of the response to unexpected policy actions 
from eq. (2) will be biased if the market-based measure responds to information other 
than monetary policy actions. To see why, let 
* u
t ff ∆  denote the unexpected target 
change, which is strictly unobservable, and 
*u
t ff ∆  denote the market-based proxy for it. 
Now assume that the market-based measure response to ambient news ( t N ) and the 
unexpected target change, i.e., 
                                                 
2 Poole and Rasche (2000) and Poole et al., (2002) used eq. (3) exclusively as their measure of the 
monetary policy shock. The results presented here are qualitatively the same when Poole and Rasche’s 
(2000) measure is used.   8 
** uu
t t tt ff N ff λδ ν ∆ = +∆ + , 
(7) 
where λ  and δ  denote the response of the market-based measure to ambient news and 
unexpected target changes, respectively, and  t v  denotes an idiosyncratic shock to the 
market-based measure. Assume further that the interest rate also responds to ambient 
news and unexpected target changes, i.e., 
* u
t t tt i N ff µθ ω ∆= +∆ + , 
(8) 
where µ  and θ  denote the response of the interest rate to ambient news and unexpected 
target changes, respectively, and  t ω  denotes idiosyncratic shocks. Note that  0 θδ = =  on 
days when the target is not changed or if the FOMC’s action is fully anticipated. 
Substituting eq. (8) into eq. (7) yields: 
* ()
u
t t ttt i N ff α βλ δ ν ε ∆= + +∆ + +. 
(9) 























N σ  and  *
2
u ff σ
∆  denote the variance of ambient news and unexpected target 
changes, respectively. Equation (10) shows that the estimate of β  from eq. (2) correctly 
identifies the response of the interest rate to an unexpected target change if and only if 
0 λ = , in which case,  ˆ lim / P β θδ = , i.e.,  ˆ β  measures the response of the asset price   9 
relative to the response of the market-based proxy. If  0 λ ≠ , however, estimates of β  
from eq. (2) will be biased.
3 β  Indeed, the estimate of   could be nonzero even if the 
FOMC’s action were fully anticipated, i.e.,  0 θδ = = . This bias arises because, while the 
ambient news shocks and unexpected monetary policy shocks are orthogonal, both the 
interest rate and the market-based proxy respond to other news, not simply the monetary 
policy shocks.  
Table 1, which shows the correlations between Kuttner’s measure and eight 
Treasury rates on days when there are no changes in the funds rate target or no FOMC 
meetings, demonstrates that Kuttner’s (2001) policy shock measure and Treasury rates 
respond to news other than news about monetary policy shocks. The sample period is 
June 6, 1989, through February 2, 2000, and the Treasury rates are the 3- and 6-month T-
bill rates (tb3 and tb6) and the 1-, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 20-year Treasury bond yields (t1, t3, 
t5, t7, t10, and t20). The second column of table 1 shows that Treasury rates and Kuttner 
shocks are strongly correlated on days when the funds rate target stayed the same or there 
was no FOMC meeting. Hence, Kuttner’s shock measure responds to the same news that 
moved Treasury rates. 
Some might argue that, because the FOMC was controlling the federal funds rate, 
the federal funds futures rate should respond only to monetary policy actions. This would 
be true if the FOMC were targeting and controlling the funds rate very closely; however, 
this is not the history of funds rate targeting. There was considerable uncertainty about 
the extent to which the FOMC was targeting the funds rate and the precise level of the 
                                                 
3 Estimates from eq. (6) could also suffer from simultaneous equation bias. For example, for a period 
during the early 1990s, the funds rate target was changed shortly after the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
released the employment report, igniting speculation that the FOMC was responding to the employment 
report.    10 
funds rate target during much of Kuttner’s (2001) sample period. The uncertainty 
diminished over time, as discussed below, but was not eliminated until February 2000. 
Thornton (2006a) shows that, although the FOMC effectively returned to a funds 
rate operating procedure in September 1982, the FOMC officially maintained it was 
targeting borrowed reserves.
4 Indeed, until the mid-1990s, the FOMC remained 
ambiguous about the extent to which it was targeting the funds rate. For example, at the 
conclusion of its February 1994 meeting, when the FOMC began the practice of 
announcing policy actions, the funds rate was not mentioned. The statement read, ‘the 
Federal Open Market Committee decided to increase slightly the degree of pressure on 
reserve positions. The action is expected to be associated with a small increase in short-
term money market interest rates’ (Board of Governors, 1994). Prior to February 1994, 
market participants did not have complete knowledge of the extent to which the FOMC 
was using the federal funds rate as a policy instrument. Most target changes occurred 
between FOMC meetings and the market had to infer whether the FOMC had taken a 
policy action from signals that the Desk provided in conducting daily open market 
operations (e.g., Feinman, 1993).
5
Over time, the FOMC became increasingly open about the extent to which it was 
relying on the funds rate to implement monetary policy and about the level of the target. 
For example, when it reduced the funds rate target by 25 basis points in July 1995, the 
FOMC’s statement read, ‘the Federal Open Market Committee decided to decrease 
slightly the degree of pressure on bank reserve positions… today’s action will be 
 
                                                 
4 See Thornton (2006a) for several reasons why the FOMC preferred to be seen as targeting borrowed 
reserves rather than the funds rate. 
5 The classic case of misinterpreting the Desk’s signal occurred the day before Thanksgiving 1989, when 
market analysts misinterpreted the Desk’s action as a signal the Fed had eased policy.   11 
reflected in a 25 basis point decline in the federal funds rate from about 6 percent to 
about 5-3/4 percent’ (Board of Governors, 1995). The FOMC did not officially announce 
it was targeting the funds rate until December 21, 1999, when it announced that, ‘The 
Federal Open Market Committee made no change today in its target for the federal funds 
rate’ (Board of Governors, 2000). Ambiguity about the level of the target was not 
completely eliminated until the February 2, 2000, FOMC statement which read: ‘The 
Federal Open Market Committee voted today to raise its target for the federal funds rate 
by 25 basis points to 5-3/4 percent’ (Board of Governors, 2000). 
Ambiguity about the funds rate target is reflected in the behavior of the funds rate 
relative to the target. Figure 1 presents the absolute daily difference between the funds 
rate and the funds rate target from September 6, 1989, through June 29, 2007. Daily 
differences of the funds rate from the target were very large prior to 2000. The average 
absolute difference was 14 basis points before 2000 and only 5 basis points after. 
The large daily differences of the funds rate from the target are also reflected in 
monthly average data presented in figure 2. Prior to 2000, the monthly average difference 
is 5 basis points or larger for one-third of the months. In contrast, differences this large 
occur for only 3% of the months from 2000 forward. Given this uncertainty and the fact 
that the funds rate could deviate significantly from the FOMC’s target, it is not difficult 
to understand why the federal funds futures rate might respond to news that would affect 
interest rates more generally. However, after 2000 the market not only knew the precise 
level of the FOMC’s funds rate target, but Chairman Greenspan frequently signaled the 
magnitude of the next target change. Hence, there was no uncertainty about the target and 
much less uncertainty about the next target change.   12 
Moreover, if future rates respond only to actual or expected future policy actions, 
the correlations should be higher on days when there are relatively large Kuttner shocks 
because revisions of market participants’ expectations about the FOMC’s funds rate 
target should occur relatively infrequently and be associated with relatively large Kuttner 
shocks. This is not the case, however. Columns 3 through 6 of table 1 present the 
correlations for subsamples based on the absolute magnitude of Kuttner shocks. The 




t ff ∆  is less than 2.5 basis points. 
4. Correcting for the Joint-Response Bias 
The joint-response bias exists because interest rates and market-based monetary policy 
shock measures respond to all information relevant to interest rates. Hence, in order to 
identify the effect of surprise monetary policy actions on interest rates, it is necessary to 
account for the response of interest rates to ambient news. This is accomplished by using 
the market-based measure of a monetary policy shock on all days as a latent variable to 
account for the market’s reaction to ambient news. Specifically, it can be achieved by 
estimating: 
** () ()
n u mps u




t ff ∆  denotes Kuttner’s (2001) market-based measure of unexpected target 
changes, PE denotes a dummy variable that is 1 on days with monetary policy events 
and zero otherwise, 
n β  denotes the joint response of interest rates and market-based 
measures of monetary policy shocks to ambient news, and 
mps β  denotes the joint 
response of the interest rate and the market-based measure to unexpected policy events.   13 
The coefficient 
mps β  reflects the marginal change in the interest rate associated with 
unexpected policy events. If 
mps β  is not significantly different from zero, the market’s 
reaction to a surprise monetary policy event is no different from its reaction to ambient 
news. The coefficient 
n β  is an estimate of the joint-response bias of the estimate of β  
from eq. (2). This procedure has three important advantages: it is simple to implement, it 
provides an estimate of the joint-response bias, and it does not require the use of either 
ultra-high-frequency data or strong, and perhaps questionable, variance restrictions. 
4.1 The Response of Treasury Rates to Monetary Policy Shocks 
The initial investigation of the effect of the joint-response bias uses Kuttner’s 
(2001) sample period: June 6, 1989, through February 2, 2000. Unlike Kuttner, whose 
policy events include only days when the funds rate target changes, the policy event here 
consists of days when the target is changed or there is an FOMC meeting. The latter is 
included because the market could be surprised if there were a meeting without a target 
change.
6
A comparison of the sample sizes across the columns of table 1 reveals that there 
are a small number of unusually large Kuttner shocks during the sample period. 
Specifically, there are 26 shocks that are 30 basis points or larger in absolute value; 
however, only one of these occurs on a policy-event day.
  
7
                                                 
6 Care must be taken here because, as noted, the public was not aware that the FOMC was targeting the 
funds rate over this entire period. Moreover, prior to February 1994, most target changes were made during 
the intermeeting period. Hence, it is not clear that the market would have been surprised if the target were 
not changed at a meeting. To see whether these factors may contribute to the results, the equation was also 
estimated using only target changes and over the period February 5, 1994 through February 2, 2000. The 
results were quantitatively similar to those reported here in both instances. 
 All but one of the remaining 
25 unusually large shocks occur early or late in the month, tend to be clustered, and are 
not associated with unusually large changes in any of the Treasury rates (see Appendix B 
7 This occurred on July 2, 1992.   14 
for details). These characteristics suggest that the unusually large Kuttner shocks are 
idiosyncratic to the federal funds futures market. Given these facts and the sensitivity of 
ordinary least squares estimates to extreme observations, these 25 days were excluded 
from the sample; however, the qualitative conclusions are robust to the inclusion of these 
observations. 




t t ttt i ff ff ff αβ β ε ∆ = + ∆ + ∆ −∆ +, 
(12) 
for each of eight Treasury rates.
8
2 R
 These estimates are reported in table 2. The table 
presents the parameter estimates, the corresponding p-values, as well as estimates of   
and the standard error (SE).
9
2 β
 The estimates are similar to those reported by Kuttner 
(2001). None of the estimates of   are statistically significant, indicating that 
anticipated policy actions are already reflected in rates. In contrast, all of the estimates of 
1 β  are positive and statistically significant, indicating that surprise monetary policy 
actions have a strong positive effect on interest rates across the term structure. The 
estimated response of the 3- and 6-month T-bill rates are much larger than those obtained 
by Cook and Hahn (1989) and the estimates decline monotonically as the term to 
maturity lengthens. 
                                                 
8 The Kuttner shocks on days when the funds rate target changed used in this article differ on a few 
occasions from those used by Kuttner (2001). The differences are twofold: First, the dates of target changes 
are from Thornton (2006a) and differ from Kuttner’s on three days. There were also six days when the 
values are different, apparently because of differences in the futures rates used here and those used by 
Kuttner (2001). Appendix A shows the Kuttner shocks used here and Kuttner’s (2001) shocks. In any 
event, these small differences are not important for the qualitative results presented here. 
9 The covariance matrix for this and all other equations reported in this paper is obtained using a 
heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent estimator.   15 
The effect of the joint-response bias is investigated by estimating eq. (11). The 
estimates, presented in table 3, show that, consistent with the joint response to ambient 
news, estimates of 
n β  are positive and statistically significant for all rates. In contrast, 
estimates of 
mps β  are statistically significant only for Treasuries with maturities of one 
year or less. For maturities beyond one year, there is no statistically significant effect of a 
surprise target change beyond the joint response to ambient news. The sum of the 
estimates of 
n β  and 
mps β  is somewhat smaller than the corresponding estimate of  1 β  in 
table 2; however, the null hypothesis  1 ˆˆ ˆ n mps ββ β +=  cannot be rejected at any reasonable 
significance level for any of the eight rates. All in all, the estimates show that the joint-
response bias is relatively large. 
4.2 Ambient News or Expectations of Future Target Changes? 
There are reasons to doubt whether the response on non-policy events might not be due to 
ambient news. For example, Rudebusch (1998) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) have 
suggested the FOMC frequently responded to the employment report. Moreover, there is 
evidence that the bond market responds to ‘headline’ economic announcements (e.g., 
Fleming and Remolona, 1999; Balduzzi et al., 2001). Other analysts (Kohn and Sack, 
2004; Gürkaynak et al., 2005; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007; and Blinder et al., 2008) 
have shown that bond yields also respond to other central bank communication. 
Consequently, the response to ambient news in table 3 may reflect revised expectations of 
policy actions associated with headline news or Federal Reserve communication. If 
changes in the federal funds futures rate reflect changes in the market’s expectation of 
future policy actions, the response of interest rates to Kuttner shocks should be larger on 
headline news and Federal Reserve communication days than on other days.   16 
The possibility that the response to ambient news in table 3 might reflect the 
markets’ reaction to other policy news is investigated by including 
* hu
t h ff h β +∆  and 
* cu
t c ff c β +∆ , where h and c are dummy variables that are equal to 1 on headline news 
and Federal Reserve communication days, respectively, and zero otherwise. Federal 
Reserve communication days are days when the Chairman makes a speech or gives 
congressional testimony. 17 of the 42 target changes occurred on a day when there was a 
headline news announcement (see Appendix C for a list of headline news 
announcements). 
The results are presented in table 4. To conserve space only the slope coefficients 
are reported. A comparison of the results in table 4 with those in table 3 shows that 
allowing for headline news and Fed communications has very little effect on the 
estimates of either 
n β  or 
mps β . The estimates of 
n β  are slightly smaller but remain 
statistically significant and consistent with the ambient news interpretation. The estimates 
of
mps β , which are statistically significant, are essentially unchanged; those that were not 
statistically significant remain so. 
Estimates of 
h β  are positive but statistically significant only for maturities of one 
year or longer. Hence, it appears that headline news has no effect on shorter-term rates. 
The estimates of 
c β  are all negative, but not statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level. Hence, once the joint-response bias is accounted for, Federal Reserve 
communications appear to have no statistically significant effect on Treasury yields. 
 
   17 
4.3 The Response to Monetary Shocks Since 2000 
By 2000, the FOMC funds target rate was well known. So too was the FOMC’s practice 
of changing the target at regularly scheduled meetings, except in unusual circumstances. 
Moreover, Chairman Greenspan frequently signaled target changes in advance of a 
FOMC meeting. Consequently, there were fewer surprise target changes. This is reflected 
in the Kuttner shocks on days when the funds rate target was changed, presented in table 
5. Kuttner shocks are relatively small with four exceptions: the three intermeeting target 
changes that occurred on January 3, April 18, and September 17 of 2001, and the 
November 6, 2002, target change, when the reduction in the target rate was larger than 
expected. The lack of large Kuttner shocks is particularly pronounced after May 2004: 
There are no Kuttner shocks larger than 3 basis points in absolute value. This is not 
surprising because at the May 2004 meeting the FOMC adopted the ‘measured pace’ 
language in its press statement. This language was widely regarded as indicating that the 
FOMC would increase the funds rate target by 25 basis points at the next meeting. The 
FOMC fulfilled this expectation at each of the next 14 meetings.
10
It is also the case that there were 13 days when the absolute value of the shock 
was greater than or equal to 20 basis points on days when the target was not changed. As 
during the earlier sample period, these unusually large Kuttner shocks tend to occur 
toward the beginning or end of the month and are not generally associated with large 
changes in the Treasury rates. Six occur after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in September 2001 
 The language was 
modified at the December 2005 meeting and discontinued at the January 2006 meeting. 
There were three target changes after January 2006, all of which were signaled well in 
advance of the action. 
                                                 
10 See Thornton (2006b) for a discussion of the ‘measured pace’ language.   18 
(see Appendix D for details). These 13 observations are excluded in the analyses 
presented below.
11
Table 6 presents estimates of Kuttner’s (2001) equation for the period February 3, 
2000, through June 29, 2007. The estimates of 
 
1 β  are smaller than those reported in table 
2, and there is one instance where the estimate of  2 β  is statistically significant. Unlike 
estimates using pre-2000 data, there is no statistically significant response of Treasury’s 
with maturities longer than one year. 
Estimates of eq. (11), including headline news and Fed communication days, are 
presented in table 7. As before, only the estimates of the slope coefficients are presented. 
All of the estimates of 
n β  are positive, but statistically significant only for maturities up 
to one year. While longer-term yields did not respond to ambient news, they did respond 
positively to headline news and negatively to policy events. Headline news appears to 
have caused rates to rise, while policy events appear to have caused longer-term rates to 
decline significantly for maturities of one year or longer. Fed communication, however, 
had a statistically significant effect on rates of any maturity. 
The strong and statistically significant relationship between Kuttner shocks and 
ambient news at the short-end of the term structure is somewhat of a surprise because the 
FOMC’s funds rate target was well known by this time, target changes occurred almost 
exclusively at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings, and deviations of the funds rate from 
the target were relatively small. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the federal funds 
futures rate should have responded only to unexpected policy actions and not to ambient 
                                                 
11 Unlike for the pre-2000 sample period, including these observations has a significant effect on the 
qualitative conclusions. Reflecting the sensitivity of least squares to outliers, virtually none of the 
coefficient estimates is statistically significant when these observations are included, suggesting that none 
of the rates respond significant to any news regardless of the source.   19 
news. However, table 1 shows that the strength of the relationship between Kuttner 
shocks and changes in Treasury yields is essentially independent of the size of the shock. 
Moreover, while daily and monthly average deviations of the federal funds rate from the 
funds rate target are significantly smaller after early 2000, they are not zero (see figures 1 
and 2). Consequently, ambient news could affect the futures rate in much the same way 
as during the pre-2000 period, but with a much smaller effect. 
That the response of shorter-term rates to policy shocks is no different from that 
to ambient news could reflect the fact that target changes were mostly anticipated. 
However, the statistically significant response of longer-term rates would seem to be at 
odds with this interpretation. The fact that longer-term rates rose in response to headline 
news and fell in response to policy shocks is consistent with both headline news and 
policy shocks raising real interest rates, the latter a consequence of reducing inflation 
expectations.  
A striking feature of the estimates in table 7 is that the absolute values of the 
coefficients are much larger than those in table 4. This is likely because the distribution 
of Kuttner shocks is considerably more leptokurtic during the post-2000 sample period. 
Figure 3 presents the distributions of Kuttner shocks,  3 tb ∆ ,  1 t ∆ , and  10 t ∆ for the sample 
periods June 6, 1989 - February 2, 2000, and February 3, 2000 - June 29, 2007, on non-
policy event days. The distribution of Kuttner shocks is considerably more leptokurtic 
during the most recent sample period (this is also the case for headline news, 
communication, and policy event days). In contrast, the distribution of  3 tb ∆  is changed 
much less, while the distributions of  1 t ∆  and  10 t ∆  are essentially unchanged. The muted 
response of the federal funds futures rate to ambient news and headline news results in   20 
larger estimates of 
n β  and 
h β —the change in the Treasury rate per percentage point 
change in Kuttner shocks is larger. 
6. Conclusion 
Following Kuttner’s (2001) use of the federal funds futures rate to measure monetary 
policy shocks, it has become common to investigate the response of asset prices to 
unanticipated monetary policy actions using market-based measures of monetary policy 
shocks. This methodology is shown to yield biased estimates of the response of asset 
prices to monetary policy shocks when market-based measures of monetary policy 
shocks respond to news other than surprise monetary policy actions. 
This bias can be controlled for by using the market-based measure of monetary 
policy shocks as a latent variable to account for the relationship between asset prices and 
the market-based measure of monetary policy shocks associated with ambient news. A 
comparison of the results using the latent-variable methodology with the standard 
methodology shows that the latter overestimates the response of Treasury yields to 
monetary policy shocks. For the sample period between June 6, 1989, and February 2, 
2000, the standard methodology yields estimates for bonds with maturities of one year or 
less that are about 50% too large. For maturities longer than one year, the marginal 
response to monetary policy shocks is not statistically significant. For the February 3, 
2000 - June 29, 2007, period, the marginal response to monetary policy shocks is not 
statistically significant for maturities of one year or shorter, but is statistically significant 
for longer-term yields. The sign is negative, however, suggesting that a positive monetary 
policy shock caused market participants to revise down their estimate of expected 
inflation.   21 
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Table 1: Correlation of Kuttner Shocks with Changes in Treasury Rates 
(June 6, 1989 - February 2, 2000) 
  full sample 
* | | 30
u
t ff ∆<  
* | | 15
u
t ff ∆<  
* | |5
u
t ff ∆<  
* | | 2.5
u
t ff ∆< 
3 tb   24.09  30.57  27.32  21.89  20.16 
6 tb   25.85  33.56  30.59  25.35  21.67 
1 t   26.11  33.11  31.29  26.79  22.70 
3 t   19.72  24.84  25.55  22.01  18.63 
5 t   17.22  21.44  22.72  20.14  17.28 
7 t   14.80  18.15  19.79  18.24  16.47 
10 t   12.58  15.58  17.02  16.50  14.93 
20 t   24.09  30.57  27.32  21.89  20.16 
No. of Obs.  2668  2642  2584  2254  1828 
 
 
Table 2: Response to Monetary Policy Shocks Using Kuttner’s Equation 
(June 6, 1989 - February 2, 2000) 
  α   p-value 
1 β   p-value 
2 β   p-value  2 R   SE 
3 tb   0.000  0.922  0.792  0.000  0.039  0.221  0.103  0.047 
6 tb   0.000  0.846  0.778  0.000  0.028  0.371  0.102  0.047 
1 t   0.000  0.816  0.748  0.000  0.013  0.699  0.077  0.052 
3 t   0.000  0.975  0.476  0.000  -0.009  0.835  0.022  0.061 
5 t   0.000  0.983  0.430  0.000  -0.044  0.291  0.017  0.062 
7 t   0.000  0.911  0.346  0.000  -0.056  0.170  0.011  0.060 
10 t   0.000  0.838  0.290  0.000  -0.057  0.141  0.008  0.058 
20 t   0.000  0.779  0.229  0.000  -0.057  0.116  0.006  0.054 
 
 
Table 3: Joint-Response-Bias-Corrected Response to Monetary Policy Shocks (June 6, 1989 - February 2, 2000) 
  α′  p-value  α′′   p-value  n β   p-value  mps β   p-value  2 R   SE 
3 tb   0.001  0.469  -0.014  0.007  0.241  0.000  0.519  0.000  0.145  0.046 
6 tb   0.001  0.277  -0.015  0.014  0.272  0.000  0.468  0.000  0.158  0.045 
1 t   0.001  0.384  -0.009  0.120  0.319  0.000  0.404  0.000  0.139  0.050 
3 t   0.001  0.601  -0.009  0.211  0.314  0.000  0.130  0.211  0.068  0.060 
5 t   0.000  0.683  -0.007  0.345  0.276  0.000  0.114  0.273  0.051  0.061 
7 t   0.000  0.828  -0.005  0.454  0.252  0.000  0.054  0.594  0.040  0.059 
10 t   0.000  0.900  -0.006  0.416  0.229  0.000  0.020  0.831  0.035  0.057 
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Table 4: : Joint-Response-Bias-Corrected Response to Monetary Policy Shocks Allowing for Headline News 
and Federal Reserve Communication (June 6, 1989 - February 2, 2000) 
  n β   p-value  h β   p-value  c β   p-value  mps β   p-value  2 R   SE 
3 tb   0.240  0.000  0.015  0.817  -0.042  0.639  0.518  0.000  0.148  0.046 
6 tb   0.262  0.000  0.046  0.470  -0.060  0.547  0.464  0.000  0.158  0.045 
1 t   0.292  0.000  0.133  0.052  -0.160  0.128  0.390  0.000  0.143  0.050 
3 t   0.276  0.000  0.187  0.010  -0.229  0.080  0.109  0.294  0.073  0.059 
5 t   0.236  0.000  0.180  0.012  -0.193  0.116  0.095  0.354  0.056  0.060 
7 t   0.218  0.000  0.154  0.021  -0.165  0.151  0.038  0.707  0.044  0.059 
10 t   0.198  0.000  0.147  0.018  -0.170  0.121  0.004  0.967  0.038  0.057 






Table 5: Kuttner Shocks on Days When the Target Changed (February 3, 2000 - 
June 29, 2007) 
Date  Kuttner Shock  Date  Kuttner Shock 
3/21/2000  -3  8/10/2004  1 
5/16/2000  4  9/21/2004  3 
1/3/2001  -38  11/10/2004  0 
1/31/2001  0  12/14/2004  0 
3/20/2001  6  2/2/2005  0 
4/18/2001  -43  3/22/2005  0 
5/15/2001  -8  5/3/2005  0 
6/27/2001  10  6/30/2005  0 
8/21/2001  3  8/9/2005  0 
9/17/2001  -32  9/20/2005  1 
10/2/2001  -6  11/1/2005  0 
11/6/2001  -10  12/12/2005  0 
12/11/2001  0  1/31/2006  0 
11/6/2002  -19  3/28/2006  0 
6/25/2003  12  5/10/2006  -1 













Table 6: Response to Monetary Policy Shocks Using Kuttner’s Equation 
(February 3, 2000 - June 29, 2007) 
  α   p-value  1 β   p-value  2 β   p-value  2 R   SE 
3 tb   -0.001  0.324  0.456  0.000  0.052  0.123  0.053  0.041 
6 tb   -0.001  0.205  0.401  0.000  0.072  0.045  0.059  0.036 
1 t   -0.002  0.220  0.284  0.004  0.026  0.482  0.015  0.046 
3 t   -0.002  0.325  -0.004  0.982  0.054  0.253  0.000  0.068 
5 t   -0.002  0.319  -0.025  0.889  0.042  0.364  0.000  0.068 
7 t   -0.002  0.262  -0.087  0.626  0.002  0.960  0.000  0.066 
10 t   -0.002  0.264  -0.122  0.459  -0.003  0.933  0.000  0.063 
20 t   -0.002  0.252  -0.126  0.219  -0.013  0.639  0.001  0.056 
 
 
Table 7: Joint-Response-Bias-Corrected Response to Monetary Policy Shocks Allowing for Headline News 
and Federal Reserve Communication (February 3, 2000 - June 29, 2007) 
  n β   p-value  h β   p-value  c β   p-value  mps β   p-value  2 R   SE 
3 tb   0.452  0.049  0.136  0.404  -0.012  0.969  -0.063  0.776  0.110  0.039 
6 tb   0.344  0.006  0.339  0.023  0.210  0.400  -0.088  0.533  0.123  0.035 
1 t   0.327  0.009  0.557  0.000  0.325  0.222  -0.273  0.049  0.071  0.045 
3 t   0.237  0.109  0.765  0.000  0.385  0.390  -0.541  0.001  0.028  0.067 
5 t   0.224  0.112  0.659  0.000  0.072  0.867  -0.506  0.003  0.019  0.067 
7 t   0.185  0.155  0.641  0.000  0.139  0.743  -0.531  0.001  0.018  0.066 
10 t   0.181  0.143  0.520  0.000  0.125  0.738  -0.515  0.001  0.015  0.062 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Difference Between the Federal Funds Rate and the FOMC's Funds Rate 
Target



















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: The Monthly Average Absolute Difference of the Effective 
Funds Rate from the Funds Rate Target, July 1989-June 2007  29 
Figure 3: Densities for June 6, 1989 - February 2, 2000 and 
February 3, 2000 - June 29, 2007 Sample Periods, Solid and 
Dashed Lines, Respectively 
 






   
Appendix A: Kuttner Shocks Used Here and the Shocks From Kuttner (2001) for Kuttner’s Sample 
Period 
Date   Kuttner shock  Kuttner’s shock  Date   Kuttner shock  Kuttner’s shock 
6/6/1989  -0.01  -0.01  12/20/1991  -0.28  -0.28 
7/7/1989  -0.03  -0.03  4/9/1992  -0.24  -0.24 
7/27/1989  0  0  7/2/1992  -0.36  -0.36 
10/16/1989  -0.21  na  9/4/1992  -0.22  -0.22 
10/18/1989  na  0.00  2/4/1994  0.12  0.12 
11/6/1989  0.04  0.04  3/22/1994  -0.03  -0.03 
12/20/1989  -0.17  -0.17  4/18/1994  0.10  0.10 
7/13/1990  -0.14  -0.14  5/17/1994  0.13  0.13 
10/29/1990  -0.02  -0.31  8/16/1994  0.14  0.14 
11/14/1990  0.04  0.04  11/15/1994  0.14  0.14 
12/7/1990  -0.27  -0.27  2/1/1995  0.05  0.05 
12/18/1990  na  -0.21  7/6/1995  -0.01  -0.01 
12/19/1990  -0.23  na  12/19/1995  -0.10  -0.10 
1/8/1991  na  -0.18  1/31/1996  -0.07  -0.07 
1/9/1991  -0.13  na  3/25/1997  0.03  0.03 
2/1/1991  -0.26  -0.25  9/29/1998  0.06  0.00 
3/8/1991  -0.16  -0.16  10/16/1998  -0.217  -0.26 
4/30/1991  -0.17  -0.17  11/17/1998  -0.06  -0.06 
8/6/1991  -0.15  -0.15  6/30/1999  -0.04  -0.04 
9/13/1991  -0.05  -0.05  8/24/1999  0.00  0.02 
10/31/1991  -0.05  -0.05  11/16/1999  0.09  0.09 
11/6/1991  -0.13  -0.12  2/2/2000  -0.05  -0.05 
12/6/1991  -0.09  -0.09         31 
 
   
Appendix B: Kuttner Shocks and Changes in Treasury Rates on Days When There Are 
Unusually Large Kuttner Shocks and No Target Change (basis points) 
Date  K-shock  3 tb   6 tb   1 t   3 t   5 t   7 t   10 t   20 t  
12/27/1989  47  -3  -4  -1  1  -1  -3  -1  -2 
12/28/1989  41  -5  -4  -5  -4  -4  -3  -3  -2 
1/2/1990  -31  3  2  5  3  1  1  1  1 
9/24/1990  30  3  4  6  7  6  5  5  5 
9/27/1990  -40  -10  -13  -12  -10  -11  -9  -9  -9 
12/26/1990  -50  -5  -4  -5  -3  -6  -5  -5  -5 
12/27/1990  109  -1  0  0  -4  -3  -4  -4  -5 
1/2/1991  -41  3  0  -8  -10  -9  -10  -11  -11 
1/22/1991  -31  0  -3  -2  -1  2  2  4  5 
1/23/1991  35  8  1  0  -1  -3  -3  -3  -2 
1/24/1991  53  -1  -2  -5  -4  -6  -3  -4  -4 
1/25/1991  46  4  5  7  4  6  5  6  6 
1/28/1991  72  9  3  3  2  0  0  0  0 
12/24/1991  49  4  1  5  1  1  2  0  0 
12/27/1991  -46  4  -4  -1  -2  0  -1  -3  -1 
1/2/1992  -46  0  1  1  2  5  8  7  6 
11/27/1992  100  2  2  6  13  10  10  9  7 
5/2/1994  41  13  12  5  4  5  5  3  1 
11/25/1994  54  1  1  1  1  1  0  -1  -2 
12/27/1994  -31  6  4  -2  -6  -8  -9  -9  -9 
4/27/1999  70  3  3  2  -5  -2  -2  -1  -2 
5/13/1999  -31  -1  -1  -4  -8  -10  -12  -10  -9 
5/14/1999  36  5  5  11  19  19  23  21  16 
12/27/1989  47  -3  -4  -1  1  -1  -3  -1  -2 
12/28/1989  41  -5  -4  -5  -4  -4  -3  -3  -2   32 
 
Appendix C: Headline News Events 
Unemployment rate 
Housing starts  
Industrial production 
Index of leading economic indicators 
GDP first announced 
Producer price index 
Retail sales 
Consumer price index 





Appendix D: Kuttner Shocks and Changes in Treasury Rates on Days When There Are 
Unusually Large Kuttner Shocks and No Target Change (basis points), February 3, 2000 - 
June 29, 2007 
Date  K-shock  3 tb   6 tb   1 t   3 t   5 t   7 t   10 t   20 t  
10/24/2000  51  1  1  4  3  4  4  4  4 
10/25/2000  -52  4  2  4  3  4  5  4  4 
4/2/2001  -42  -8  7  1  4  4  6  5  4 
9/13/2001  -21  -52  -48  -50  -50  -38  -28  -20  -9 
9/18/2001  -45  -11  -6  -3  1  2  8  9  15 
9/19/2001  -57  -29  -23  -20  -13  -11  -5  -3  0 
9/20/2001  39  3  5  7  9  7  6  6  8 
9/21/2001  27  3  -4  -3  0  -3  -4  -5  -5 
9/24/2001  50  13  5  3  3  6  4  3  -1 
12/3/2001  -28  0  2  2  -2  -4  -4  -3  -5 
5/2/2005  24  3  2  1  -2  -2  -1  0  0 
4/3/2006  21  4  5  4  2  3  3  2  1 
7/3/2006  27  7  7  5  1  1  1  0  2 
 
 
 
 